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TAXING FAMILIES FAIRLY
Patricia A. Cain*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal tax law and the tax law of an increasing number
of states apply vastly different concepts of the family for
purposes of assessing taxes. Federal tax law, for example,
does not recognize same-sex marriages from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.' Nor does it recognize civil
unions from Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New
Hampshire, statewide domestic partnerships from California,
Oregon, Maine, and Washington, or reciprocal beneficiary
relationships from the State of Hawaii.2 In six of these states
that recognize same-sex partnerships, the partners file joint
returns at the state level and are generally subject to the
same state income tax rules as married couples.' At the
federal level, these same people must file as single
taxpayers.4 This difference between federal and state law is a
* Inez Mabie Distinguished Professor of Law, Santa Clara University.
1. See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 USC § 7 (2000) (providing that
same-sex marriages shall not be treated as marriages for purposes of federal
law).
2. No one has yet brought an appropriate challenge to the tax laws
claiming that civil unions or domestic partners should be treated as spouses. A
couple from Illinois did try to claim an equal protection violation for failure of
the tax statutes to recognize them as spouses, but their claim suffered from the
fact that they were not in any sort of state-sanctioned relationship. Mueller v.
Comm'r, No. 02-1189, 2002 WL 1401297, (7th Cir. June 26, 2002). The taxpayer,
appearing pro se, appeared to be challenging the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), but the Court of Appeals held that DOMA was simply not implicated
because the couple was not married, nor had they attempted to have their
relationship recognized by the state as a marriage. Id.
3. The six states authorizing joint returns are Massachusetts, Vermont,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Oregon, and California. Neither New Hampshire nor
Washington has a state income tax. Hawaii is considering whether to extend
joint return filing to reciprocal beneficiaries. Maine does not offer joint filing to
unmarried couples.
4. As single taxpayers, they may also be entitled to file as "heads of
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recent occurrence. It is creating excessive burdens on same-
sex couples and on state taxation authorities. It is also
completely out of line with a long history in the federal tax
law of recognizing relationships and property rights under
state law.
The federal government's refusal to recognize the
statuses of same-sex partners, which have been created by
state law, can only be corrected by legislation at the federal
level.5 The reasons for supporting such a legislative remedy
are: (1) to eliminate uncertainty in the federal tax law, (2) to
reduce the burden on state taxing authorities, and (3) to
ensure that all couples are taxed accurately and fairly.
This article will review the history of federal tax law's
recognition of the family unit as well as the role of state law
in federal tax decisions. It will then focus on the various
state law regimes that recognize new family statuses that
remain unrecognized at the federal level, identify some of the
key differences in tax treatment, and dispel the myth that
taxing couples as married is intended to benefit or support
the marital unit. It will conclude with suggestions about
possible solutions to the problem that has been created by the
tension between federal and state law.
II. TAXATION AND THE FAMILY: A BRIEF HISTORY
Marriage and family relationships matter in tax law.
How much they should matter is a subject of great debate
among tax scholars. As Boris Bittker wrote in 1975, "[a]
persistent problem in the theory of income taxation is
whether natural persons should be taxed as isolated
individuals, or as social beings whose family ties to other
households" if they meet the requirements. See I.R.C. §§ 1(b), 2(b) (2000)
(defining head of household and providing the rates).
5. Theoretically, a federal court could strike down individual tax statutes
on equal protection grounds if a married couple in Massachusetts files a lawsuit
challenging DOMA. Similarly a federal court could strike down on equal
protection grounds an individual tax statute that treats spouses differently from
similarly situated partners in a civil union or domestic partnership. But, these
actions would have to occur in individual taxpayer suits in which the specific
statute or statutes had been applied to tax the couple differently from married
couples. Given the limitations on challenges to the federal tax law, a civil- rights
litigation strategy to challenge the entire Internal Revenue Code's treatment of
same-sex couples would not be possible. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7421 (2000)
(prohibiting suits to restrain assessment of collection of tax except in limited
circumstances).
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taxpayers affect their taxpaying capacity." 6  This problem
poses at least three issues for families: (1) Should families
aggregate their income and deductions and report taxable
income as a single unit? (2) Should transactions between
family members be accorded the same tax consequences as
market transactions between unrelated taxpayers? (3) How
should the tax law account for intra-family transfers that
occur as a result of state-imposed obligations of support and
property division?
A. Family Aggregation of Income and Deductions
History shows us that Congress did not consider the
question of whether family members should be taxed as a
unit or as individuals when it adopted the modern income tax
in 1913. Congress made a simple decision at that time:
income taxes would be assessed against individuals.7
Furthermore, each individual taxpayer would be subject to
the same progressive rate schedule.'
The early revenue acts contained no provisions
addressing the effect that marriage or family responsibilities
would have on taxpaying ability, except for the allowance of
an additional $1000 personal exemption if the taxpayer was
married.9 Four years later, in 1917, a dependency exemption
of $200 for each child was added.1 ° Joint returns became
optional in 1918, but they were for convenience only.11
The debate over whether to tax individuals or family
units arose in the United States in response to a number of
6. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389, 1391 (1975).
7. Id. at 1400 (discussing the early tax statutes' focus on taxation of
individuals rather than families).
8. Id. Not every country adopted the individualistic views of the United
States with respect to taxation. See generally Louise Dulude, Taxation of the
Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American, British, French, and Swedish
Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67 (1985) (examining the treatment of families
versus individual taxpayers under the tax systems of five different countries).
For example, in Great Britain taxes were assessed against the combined
incomes of husbands and wives, and in France, the tax unit included not only
the spouses but also all persons dependent upon the husband. Id.
9. See Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1600 n.96
(1977) ("The Revenue Act of 1913 had granted every taxpayer a personal
exemption of $3000, plus an additional $1000 if married.").
10. Id. at 1600.
11. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
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hotly contested tax cases involving the attribution of income
between husbands and wives. These cases were resolved on
the basis of state family law and property law. Community
property rules, married women's property acts, spousal
control over property and income, and family support
obligations all played a part. In sum, the move away from
taxation of individuals to a norm that treats the married
couple as the taxpaying unit resulted primarily from the
differences between state laws and the federal government's
desire to accommodate these differences.
1. The Move from Separate to Joint Returns
The Sixteenth Amendment authorizing an unapportioned
income tax was adopted on March 1, 1913. That October,
Congress passed an income tax statute that taxed income at
the rate of one percent. A one percent surtax was applied to
incomes above $20,000, increasing in one percent increments
to a maximum surtax of six percent on net incomes above
$500,000.12
In 1913, there were no joint returns. A 1914 pair of
Treasury Decisions clarified that husband and wife were to
file separate returns reporting their separate incomes. An
optional joint return was introduced in 1918, which allowed
husbands and wives to file a single return and report
aggregate income and deductions. 4 This option provided a
desirable convenience for those taxpayers whose combined
income was below the amount that would trigger the surtax
rate. 5 However, with the increase in rates that occurred in
12. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. For a brief discussion of the
history of early tax rates, see generally Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening
Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed Progressivity, 5
FLA. TAx REV. 1 (2001).
13. T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 281 (1914); T.D. 2137, 17 Treas.
Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 57-58 (1914), discussed in George Donworth, Federal Taxation
of Community Incomes-The Recent History of Pending Questions, 4 WASH. L.
REV. 145, 147 (1929).
14. See Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return:
Its Implications for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 539 (1998).
15. In 1918, a huge increase in rates was enacted in order to help finance
World War I. The normal tax was set at six percent on net income of $4000,
with a surtax of twelve percent on amounts in excess of $4000. Additional
surtaxes were imposed ranging from one percent to sixty-five percent, creating a
top marginal bracket of seventy-seven percent. Combining incomes of husband
and wife provided the aggregate income amount was below $4000 would avoid
the progressivity of the higher surtaxes. See Lindsey, supra note 12, at 13-14
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1918,16 joint returns that aggregated spousal incomes were
not attractive to high-income taxpayers. Instead, the 1918
rate increase encouraged high-income taxpayers to seek even
more aggressively the benefit of splitting income between
spouses. 7 In community property states, spouses took the
position that community income was owned equally by the
spouses and thus could be split between them for purposes of
reporting income.'8
a. Treasury's Initial Position on Community
Earnings
In 1920, the Internal Revenue Service issued Office
Decision No. 426, authorizing spouses in two community
property states, Texas and Washington, to file separate tax
returns, with each spouse reporting half of the income from
community property.' 9 Community earnings from spousal
labor, however, were not to be split for tax purposes.
Community property spouses argued that they should also be
allowed to split earnings. In 1920, the Attorney General
concluded that husbands and wives in Texas could split the
husband's earnings equally between them in their separate
tax returns. 20 Early in 1921, the Attorney General issued a
further opinion concluding that spouses in all of the eight
community property states, except California, could split the
husband's earned income and allow the wife to report her half
separately as her income.21
(discussing the early tax rates); see also Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War,
Taxes and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 Veterans' Bonus and
the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAx L. REV. 373, 374-76 (2006) (discussing the
impact of World War I on the federal tax system).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. In a progressive rate structure, the last dollar of income is taxed at the
top marginal bracket. In 1918, stacking a wife's income on top of the husband's
income would tax her at a higher rate once their combined income exceeded
$4000. The first dollar after $4000 was taxed at eighteen percent, whereas the
first $4000 was taxed at only six percent.
18. Donworth, supra note 13, at 147.
19. I.R.S. O.D. 426, 2 C.B. 198 (1920).
20. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 229 (1920), discussed in Donworth, supra note 13, at
148.
21. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921), discussed in Donworth, supra note 13, at
150. The conclusion about California was based on the fact that state courts in
California had characterized the wife's interest in community property as a
"mere expectancy." In all other community property states the wife had a vested
present interest in all community income, whether derived from property or
20081 809
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Now it was the spouses in non-community property
states who complained. Almost immediately a bill was
introduced in Congress that would have required community
income to be included in the "gross income of the spouse
having management and control of the community
property."22  In all of the community property states,
husbands had management power over the community assets
and income. Such a statute would have taxed all community
income to the husband no matter whose efforts created the
income and no matter how vested the wife's rights in the
community property. In non-community property states, by
contrast, the passage of married women's property statutes
had given wives management power over their own earnings.
Under the proposed "management and control" standard,
spouses in common law property states would have been
entitled to file separate returns, with each spouse reporting
his or her own earned income. As a result, spouses in these
states would pay taxes at a lower rate than similar two-
earner couples in community property states. Although
introduced several times, this bill never passed.23
b. The California Problem
As early as 1918, California spouses had reported
community earnings on separate tax returns, and they
continued to do so into the 1920s, even after the Attorney
General had ruled that California community property laws
did not vest the wife with sufficient ownership over
community income. Some spouses claimed that the
community property laws entitled them to such a reporting
position despite the Attorney General's decision to the
contrary. Others accepted the law as set forth by the
Attorney General and entered into spousal agreements that
recharacterized all spousal earnings as the separate property
of the earning spouse. Or, in some cases, spouses entered
into a more limited agreement in which they agreed that the
earnings of the wife would be her separate property.24 The
from her husband's labor. Id.
22. A bill was introduced in 1921 and then again in 1924. Both failed to
pass. See George E. Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community
Property: Income Tax, 30 CAL. L. REV. 397, 397-98 (1942).
23. Id. at 153 (discussing Revenue Acts of 1923 and 1924).
24. As a result of such agreements, the wife claimed ownership of her own
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Commissioner challenged these agreements between
California spouses and taxed all community income to the
husband on the theory that he, as the manager of community
assets, maintained control over all community income. But
the agreements were valid under state law. They did in fact
transform what had once been community property into
separate property. Based on the validity of these agreements
under California law, the Board of Tax Appeals began to tax
the wife's earnings to the wife rather than the husband,
whenever the spouses had agreed that her earnings would be
her separate property.25
In 1918, California taxpayer Reuel D. Robbins and his
wife, Sadie, filed separate tax returns, each reporting one-half
of the community income. All income was derived from
community property and the earnings of Mr. Robbins. Thus
began a test case, challenging the 1921 Attorney General's
opinion as applied to California spouses.
The United States argued that California law controlled
and that under California law the wife had a mere
expectancy. Thus, she could not be considered the "owner" of
the income for tax purposes. Federal District Court Judge
Partridge, in a lengthy and lucid opinion, explained that,
although California courts had so described the wife's
interest, the substance of the California law in fact created in
the wife an interest just as vested as the interest of wives in
the other seven community property states.26
No California court had ever determined that the wife
was not a sufficiently vested owner to make half the
community income hers for federal tax purposes. Nor had the
United States Supreme Court so ruled. Nor had the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the absence of binding
precedent, Judge Partridge determined that California
spouses were entitled to split community income for federal
tax purpose, explaining that "[iut is the marriage which
creates ownership; death or divorce merely give possession."27
He ruled in favor of California taxpayers despite the
earnings and reported them on a separate return.
25. See, eg., Gassner v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 1071, 1072 (1926); Harris v.
Comm'r, 10 B.T.A. 1374, 1375 (1928).
26. Robbins v. United States, 5 F.2d 690, 691-705 (N.D. Cal. 1925), rev'd,
269 U.S. 315 (1926).
27. Id. at 705.
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government's plea that to do so would cost the federal fisc
over seventy-seven million dollars in the form of tax refunds
to California spouses.
Robbins v. United States was appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court. This was the first opportunity
for the Court to speak on the question of income splitting in
community property states. The government argued
narrowly that California wives were insufficiently vested in
community income. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
agreed, noting that California, unlike New Mexico, did not
require the consent of both spouses to all conveyances of
community property. However, he made no reference to any
other distinctions between California and other community
property states; totally ignoring the fifteen page decision from
the lower court that had detailed such distinctions and
concluded that they were more apparent than real. Holmes
ended his brief, three-page opinion, with the following
observation:
Even if we are wrong as to the law of California and
assume that the wife had an interest in the community
income that Congress could tax if so minded, it does not
follow that Congress could not tax the husband for the
whole. Although restricted in the matter of gifts, etc., he
alone has the disposition of the fund. He may spend it
substantially as he chooses, and if he wastes it in
debauchery the wife has no redress .... That he may be
taxed for such a fund seems to us to need no argument.28
c. Treasury Takes a New Position
Robbins was the first Supreme Court opinion to address
the issue of income-splitting in community property states.
Justice Holmes delivered an opinion that seemed to couriter
the Attorney General's 1920 opinion about community
property spouses in the other seven community property
states. In that opinion, Attorney General Palmer had
reasoned that the community of husband and wife was
similar to a partnership of equals. As to the husband's
control over the property, the Attorney General had
concluded: "And though the management and disposal of
community property during marriage are usually given to the
28. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 327 (1926).
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husband, this is said to be for reasons of public policy and
social economy, and not on the grounds that the husband has
any greater interest than the wife."29
Holmes, by contrast, was suggesting that the husband's
ability to manage and dispose of community funds was a
sufficient lynchpin for taxation. Control by husbands was the
rule in all community property states.3 In response to the
Holmes opinion, in 1926 Treasury officials began to
reconsider their position permitting income-splitting by
spouses in the other seven community property states. They
proposed to tax husbands on all community income on the
basis of the ability to manage and control.
Not surprisingly, taxpayers from those seven states and
their representatives in Congress responded quickly to the
notion that Treasury would reconsider its long-vested policy.
In response, Attorney General Sargent announced that he
would hold public hearings on the matter at which he would
allow taxpayers and their representatives to state their
views.3 1 These hearings ultimately resulted in a new opinion
by the Attorney General 2 in which he acknowledged that all
community property states were different, withdrew the
earlier opinions in favor of the seven community property
states, and indicated that the ability to split income on the
basis of state law would be determined in a series of test
cases that would eventually reach the United States Supreme
Court. A key point in this opinion was that "[dlecisions of the
state courts holding what rights of a proprietary nature the
wife may exercise in respect of community income are binding
29. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 229 (1920), quoted in Donworth, supra note 13, at
148.
30. Louisiana did not abandon the rule that the husband was "head and
master" of the community estate until 1980. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450
U.S. 455 (1981) (holding pre-1980 Louisiana law violated the Equal Protection
Clause). Texas did not give wives meaningful control over community property
until 1967. See Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its
Course of Development and Reform, 8 CAL. W. L. REV. 117, 131 (1971). By
contrast, in most common law property states, the effects of coverture had been
chipped away by the passage of married women's property acts and earnings
statutes, which gave married women some control over their own earnings. See
Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994) (discussing early
statutes and their narrow construction in litigation).
31. Donworth, supra note 13, at 164.
32. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 265 (1927), discussed in Donworth, supra note 13, at
164-65.
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on the federal courts."33 Because each state had its own rules
regarding the wife's interest in community property, it would
be necessary to bring a test case for each of the eight
community property states.
d. The Test Cases
In August of 1928, spouses from four community property
states, Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington, filed test
cases in federal district court. In every case, the spouses had
reported community income by allocating half to the husband
and half to the wife. In every case, the Internal Revenue
Service refused the returns and instead assessed a tax
against the husband, allocating 100% of the community
income to him. The husbands in each case paid the tax and
sued the local Collector of Internal Revenue in federal district
court, claiming a refund in the amount of the additionally
assessed tax. 4 Ultimately these cases were consolidated and
heard by the Supreme Court. In the lead case,
taxpayer/husband Seaborn sued Burns Poe, the Collector of
Internal Revenue for the District of Washington.35
The government argued in Poe v. Seaborn36 that the
community property laws of the State of Washington gave so
much control over community property and income to the
husband that he should be the one to bear the tax. This
position was a complete reversal of the earlier position of the
Attorney General, which had held that all community
property states, other than California, gave the wife a
sufficiently vested interest in community property and
income to tax her on half. The Holmes opinions in Robbins,
emphasizing control, supported the government's position in
Seaborn. The government also argued that federal tax laws
were intended to operate uniformly and that the tax burden
should fall equally on the family unit regardless of whether
the family lived in a community property state or not.
Ultimately the Supreme Court agreed with the taxpayers
in Seaborn that the tax should be borne by the owner of the
income. Since wives had a vested property right in
33. Id.
34. See Harry C. Weeks, The Community Property Income Tax Test Cases,
NATL INCOME TAX MAG. 466, 468 (1929).
35. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
36. Id.
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community property they were co-owners with their husbands
and thus should be taxed on half the community income from
property. Because wives had a similar vested right in the
community earning produced by a husband's labor, she was to
be taxed on half of earned income as well.
The companion cases from Arizona,37 Texas,38  and
Louisiana 39 all held in favor of the taxpayer on the same
grounds. All were decided on November 24, 1930. Just two
months later, on January 19, 1931, the Court extended the
income-splitting rule to California spouses as to community
property income derived in 1928 and later.4 °
From this point on, absent legislative intervention by
Congress, spouses in community property states could split
income and thereby pay a lower tax bill than spouses with the
same amount of combined income would pay in common law
property states. Income splitting between spouses outside of
the community property system had been denied in the case
of Lucas v. Earl,41 decided shortly before Poe v. Seaborn. In
Earl, the spouses had agreed to share all of their income and
property jointly. The agreement was fully enforceable under
state law. Nonetheless, Justice Holmes, writing for a
unanimous Court, opined that such assignments of earned
income could not be recognized by the tax law. The assignor
would continue to be taxed on the assigned earnings despite
the validity of the assignment under state law.42
e. The Aftermath
The tension created by the difference in tax treatment
between spouses in community property states and spouses in
other states eventually led to the enactment of joint returns.
Congress had several options: (1) they could overrule Poe v.
37. Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930).
38. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930).
39. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
40. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931). The California
legislature changed the community property statute in 1927 to provide that the
wife's interest in community property was a presently vested interest. Thus,
splitting of community income was available for California spouses for tax years
after 1927.
41. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
42. Justice Holmes' opinion includes one of the most famous metaphors in
income tax law. He concluded that "we think that no distinction can be taken
according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are
attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Id. at 115.
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Seaborn and tax earned income in community property states
to the earner rather than allowing it to be split; (2) they could
overrule Lucas v. Earl, and tax income that spouses had
agreed to share half to one spouse and half to the other; or (3)
they could take some middle road that would reduce the
difference between community and non-community property
states.
In 1933, a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means
Committee issued a preliminary report making no
recommended change "in view of the legal difficulties
involved." In 1934, Acting Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau recommended consideration of compulsory joint
returns for all spouses, but the recommendation was not
enacted.43 In that same year, Representative Treadway
introduced a bill similar to the ones rejected by Congress in
1921 and 1924 requiring community income to be taxed to the
spouse with management and control. 4' This solution was
deemed simpler than a compulsory joint return and was
supported by the Treasury, but it was never passed.45 In
1937, President Roosevelt addressed the Congress on the
issue of tax evasion, citing the division of community income
as a primary cause of revenue loss. In 1941, the Treasury
again proposed a compulsory joint return for all spouses
aimed at mitigating the community property problem as well
as reducing the ability of other spouses to arrange their
affairs in ways that would reduce tax revenues.46  The
proposal would have required spouses to pay a tax on their
aggregate income at the same rate that a single person would
have paid on the same amount of income. The result would
have been to increase the tax burden on almost all married
couples. As a tax on marriage, the proposal was attacked on
moral grounds and was ultimately defeated.
Common law property states responded to the concerns of
their citizenry by proposing community property legislation
43. Similar proposals requiring spouses to file joint returns were introduced
in 1937 and 1941, but were never passed. See Ray, supra note 22, at 398 n.6.
44. H.R. 8396, 73d Cong., (2d Sess. 1934).
45. This proposal to tax the spouse who controlled the income was
reintroduced in 1941, and again failed to pass. See Ray, supra note 22, at 397
n.4.
46. E.g., using family partnerships or closely held corporations to split
income between spouses.
47. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 1391.
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intended to gain for their spouses the same benefits available
to spouses in the eight community property states.
Oklahoma, Oregon, Hawaii, Nebraska, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania became, for at least a short time, community
property states. In 1948, Congress responded to the problem
with the enactment of the modern joint return. Under this
approach, spouses would aggregate income, but the tax paid
would be "equal to twice what a single person would pay on
one-half' of such income.48
This option satisfied numerous concerns. For one thing,
once the Supreme Court of the United States had held that
half of all community earnings belonged to the non-earning
spouse, some in Congress were afraid to tax those earnings to
the non-owning spouse. Why? In 1931, the Supreme Court
had held in Hoeper v. Wisconsin49 that it was a violation of
due process to tax one spouse on income that was owned by
the other spouse. In addition, the eight community property
states were quite populous and powerful. Thus, adopting an
option that would have repealed income-splitting for
community property spouses was simply not politically
feasible. The joint return alternative, by contrast, could
appeal to everyone because it had the effect of extending the
benefit of income-splitting to all spouses.
The point here is that the joint return was not adopted by
a Congress that had studied the pros and cons of taxing the
family unit rather than taxing the individual family
members. It was not adopted because Congress embraced the
notion of the family unit as the "correct" tax unit. It was
adopted solely in response to the political outburst by
taxpayers in non-community property states and because no
other solution was thought viable.5"
2. Refining the Rate Structure
In response to subsequent bickering by single taxpayers,
especially those with dependent children who argued that
they should be allowed to split income with their family
members, Congress has continued to refine the rate structure
48. Id. at 1412.
49. Hoeper v. Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
50. See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act
of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1948).
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to account for varying family responsibilities and benefits. 51
In 1951, special rates for taxpayers who qualified as "heads of
households" were introduced. These rates were set halfway
between those for single taxpayers and married taxpayers
filing jointly thereby acknowledging the additional family
responsibilities of such taxpayers.52 In 1968, Congress made
another adjustment to the rates to reduce the disparity
between single and married taxpayers. This adjustment was
required to account for the benefits that married couples
experienced in the form of lower household expenses due to
economies of scale and the tax-free imputed income of spouses
who provided valuable household services. Single taxpayers
were presumed to live alone and thus not experience
comparable benefits. The new rate structure was designed so
that single taxpayers would never pay more than 120% what
a married couple would pay on the same amount of income. 53
Today the rate structure differentiates among several
different types of families. Married couples aggregate income
and file using one rate schedule. The rate schedule is not
adjusted for the number of children or other dependents in
the family.54 Single taxpayers living with dependents do not
aggregate income, but they do file using a different rate
schedule designed specifically for them and giving them a
benefit equivalent to income splitting. Other single
taxpayers, no matter what sort of household or family
arrangement they have, file using still a different rate
schedule. This rate schedule was designed to tax them solely
on their own income and was grounded on the assumption
that single taxpayers live alone and do not enjoy economies of
scale or other similar benefits that married couples enjoy.
3. The Problem
This additional tinkering with the rates has created what
many commentators now call the marriage tax penalty.5
51. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 1417.
52. The specific definition of "head of household" has varied since 1951, but
it generally requires the taxpayer to maintain a home for the taxpayer and a
child or other dependent. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2000).
53. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 1422-29.
54. The tax base is adjusted for children and dependents through the
allowance of exemptions. See I.R.C. § 151 (2000).
55.Over the years there has been a significant shift in the number of tax
returns filed by married couples filing jointly and by single people. While there
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When a marital unit consists of two earners the spouses will
now pay a slightly higher tax if they report as married
taxpayers than they would if they divorced and reported as
single taxpayers. This problem has been the focus of most tax
scholarship about the family since the mid-1970s,56 although
the problem is minimized when rates are less progressive, as
they have been in recent years.57 Nonetheless, the refinement
of the rate structure in an attempt to be fair to different types
of households has created a cry for tax rates that do not
discriminate on the basis of marital status.
The main hurdle in establishing a marriage neutral tax
system is not the joint versus single return. A fair tax could
ignore marriage in setting rates by taxing each individual
according to a single rate schedule. Taxing every individual
according to the same rate schedule, however, would
reintroduce the problem that led to joint returns in the first
place, that is the problem of determining who reports how
much of the combined family income and deductions. I call
this the problem of income allocation. It arises in the context
of family households because there are often joint ownership
rights to the income 8 as well as equitable claims to its
are many social and economic explanations for this shift other than the
marriage tax penalty, it is likely that the penalty has contributed to this shift.
In 1971, seventy-eight percent of total AGI was reported on joint returns and
only sixteen percent by single, non-head of household, taxpayers. Bittker, supra
note 6, at 1427. In 2005, sixty-seven percent of total AGI was reported on joint
returns and twenty-four percent was reported by single, non-head of household,
taxpayers. See Table 1.2--All Returns: Adjusted Gross Income, Exemptions,
Deductions, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income and by Marital
Status, Tax Year 2005, IRS Statistics of Income web page at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/O,,id=96978,00.html(last visited
April 11, 2008).
56. See generally Dulude, supra note 8; Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital
Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1980);
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing,
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Edward J.
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases
in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J.
McIntyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 907 (1999);
Shari Motro, The New "I Do": Toward a Marriage Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 1509 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994).
57. In addition, in 2001, Congress offered some relief for married taxpayers
in the lowest tax bracket by broadening the fifteen percent bracket for such
couples in order to avoid the marriage tax penalty.
58. For example, earnings in community property states are owned by both
spouses. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930). But even in non-
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benefits .
Solutions to this problem are possible. For example,
allowing all couples to determine their own allocations is a
solution that would treat all couples the same, whether they
are married or not.6 0 This solution would be consistent with a
principle of honoring individual choice, but it would not tax
all couples with the same income at the same rate6 because
the couples would have the power to choose allocations that
would result in different rates of tax. A possible critique of
this solution is that extending the ability to allocate too
broadly will threaten progressivity.
In sum, the rate structure is not the only issue that
affects fair family taxation. The more difficult issue is how to
determine the appropriate tax base for each individual
taxpayer in a marriage or similar status grounded in
financial interdependency. Should income and deductions be
aggregated by spouses or should they be allocated between
spouses? If we are to attain a true marriage neutral tax
system then should we include unmarried couples in the
same aggregation or allocation rules? Which couples should
we include? If we opt for voluntary allocation, how can we
ensure that the allocations have economic substance? I will
community property states spouses often work together to produce earned
income in informal family partnerships or sole proprietorships. Income from
property is appropriately taxed to the owners of the property. Thus income
from community property belongs to the spouses, as does income from property
held as joint tenants, tenants in common, or tenants by the entirety.
59. Obligations of support create equitable claims by one spouse to the
income or property of the other if needed for support purposes. And the
equitable division at divorce rules give a non-titled spouse a strong equitable
claim to the property owned by the titled spouse.
60. E.g., if partners A and B decided to pool all income and deductions, then
their tax liability as individuals should be calculated in accord with this
decision. They could report all income and deductions on an information return,
much like a partnership return and then report individually fifty percent of the
net taxable income. By contrast, if partners C and D elected to keep their
salaries separate but share everything else equally, they should aggregate all
other income and deductions, compute a bottom line amount and add that
amount (or subtract it if negative) from the salary reported on their W-2s to
determine individual income.
61. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 1396 (identifying three basic principles of
tax law: (1) progressivity, (2) equal taxes on equal-income married couples, and
(3) a marriage neutral tax burden). As Bittker demonstrates, it is impossible to
have all three principles in a single system. The proposed solution in the text
maintains the first and the third principles, although it does create some risk
for progressivity. It only violates the second principle by giving choice to the
taxpayers which seems a minimal violation since it gives equal choice.
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return to these questions in Part V of this Article.
B. Property Transfers Between Spouses
There is another issue that is central to taxation of the
family, an issue that is related to the question of how income
and deductions should be allocated in family units. This issue
involves the tax treatment of property transfers between
spouses and partners, or other family members. Thus, this
section will explore the history of how wealth transfers
between spouses have been taxed over the years and identify
the problems created by not extending similar rules to
unmarried couples.
1. Gift and Estate Tax
Wealth transfers from one person to another, absent
adequate consideration, constitute taxable gifts. 62  The
treatment of gifts between spouses as taxable under the gift
tax created another advantage for community property
spouses as compared with spouses in common law property
states. Since community property was viewed by the tax law
as owned equally at the moment it was acquired, husbands
who were sole earners essentially vested their wives with fifty
percent of their earnings without ever having to pay a gift
tax. A gift tax is imposed on "transfers"63 of property and
under Poe v. Seaborn, the tax law did not view the creation of
community property as a transfer.' Husbands in common
law property states, by contrast, would be viewed as making a
taxable gift to their wives if they transferred to them fifty
percent of the husband's earnings after it first vested in the
husband. This result is consistent with the analysis in Lucas
v. Earl, which viewed voluntary income-sharing agreements
between spouses as "transfers" of property. 6 To remedy this
62. I.R.C. § 2512 (2000).
63. See I.R.C. § 2501 ("A tax . . . is hereby imposed . . . on the transfer of
property by gift. ").
64. See also Estate of DiMarco v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653 (1987) (holding that
where taxpayer's employer subjected employees to a plan under which at the
employee's death certain payments would be made to the surviving spouse,
there was no "transfer" by the taxpayer employee). This case is consistent with
the situation of community property spouses who are subjected to a property
regime under which property interests are involuntarily vested in each spouse
and not transferred from one spouse to another.
65. Presumably the contract between Mr. and Mrs. Earl created transfers of
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discrepancy between community property and non-
community property spouses, in 1948, along with the
adoption of joint returns, Congress adopted a fifty percent
marital deduction for spousal gifts of separate property.66
A similar advantage for community property spouses
occurred under the estate tax. Because community property
spouses each own only half of the community estate, upon the
death of either spouse, only half of the property would be
included in the gross estate. Thus an estate tax marital
deduction was required to create the requisite equality of
treatment for non-community property spouses. The 1948
Act included such a provision, authorizing spouses in common
law property states to claim a marital deduction of up to fifty
percent of the separate property in the gross estate, provided
the property was transferred to the surviving spouse.
In 1981 Congress moved closer to the concept of a single
"marital tax entity" by increasing the fifty percent marital
deduction to one hundred percent. Stanley Surrey had
argued for this sort of treatment for spousal transfers as early
as 1948.68 Critics of the one hundred percent marital
deduction emphasize the fact that it is overbroad and
provides too large a benefit to spouses who may not have been
part of the marital entity that accumulated the property that
is ultimately transferred at death.69  However, the one
property that would have been subject to the gift tax. The case, however, only
considered the income tax effect of the agreements.
66. This fifty percent marital deduction put common law property states on
a par with community property states in the following situation: Husband as
the earner acquires property and then transfers a fifty percent ownership
interest to wife. At the end of the transaction, both spouses own the property
equally, as do community property spouses, and there is no transfer tax
assessed on the transfer.
67. See Surrey, supra note 50, at 1115 (describing the 1948 Act).
68. As he explained:
[A] wife, already deprived of a husband's earning power should not be
forced to a still lower standard of living through sharing with the
Government the capital accumulation of the husband. This attitude is
not generally held with respect to the children .... I would apply the
principle of complete elimination of interspouse transfers from the
transfer tax base both to outright transfers to a spouse and to transfers
in which the spouse had an immediate beneficial interest in the
property. Thus, property left by a husband to his wife for life,
remainder to the children, would not be taxed at his death.
Surrey, supra note 50, at 1116.
69. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust
and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1740-41 (1998)
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hundred percent deduction does make sense for long-term
couples who have acquired property that contributes to a
shared standard of living (e.g., personal residences, vacation
homes, art work, antiques, as well as cash that is available
for current consumption). They rightly think of such
property, accumulated over the years, as theirs. In such
cases, when the first spouse dies, it seems inappropriate to
the surviving spouse for the Federal Government to assert a
claim to approximately one quarter of the jointly accumulated
wealth.7 ° The new marital deduction rules effectively treat
all married couples as a single entity by not assessing
transfer taxes until the property is transferred outside the
marital unit.
2. Income Tax
Transfers of property in exchange for consideration are
generally taxable sales, producing either ordinary income or
capital gains, depending on the type of property transferred.
In the first seventy years or so of the modern income tax,
transfers between spouses were generally taxed on the same
basis as transfers between strangers. The possibilities for
spousal manipulation of these rules to the detriment of the
Treasury led to piecemeal legislation that limited the most
blatant abuses, but did not repeal the general rules. Thus,
for example, when spouses sold to each other at a gain, they
would be taxed, but when they sold to each other at a loss, the
loss deduction would be denied.7 Another restriction on
spousal transfers that was enacted to prevent abuses was the
rule that if one spouse sold an asset to another spouse that
would be depreciable in the hands of the purchasing spouse,
then the selling spouse would have to report the gain on the
(claiming that the fifty percent deduction is the most generous deduction that
can be justified normatively on the basis of a presumption that spouses share
marital wealth in the same way that community property regimes presume
spouses share community property).
70. With a marital deduction of only fifty percent and a marginal estate tax
rate of approximately fifty percent, the fifty percent marital deduction would
result in the government claiming approximately twenty-five percent of the
wealth transferred from the title-holding spouse in a common law property state
to the other spouse. This would be true only after subtracting out the
exemption amount which for 2008 is two million dollars.
71. Internal Revenue Code section 267 used to limit losses on transfers
between spouses during the marriage, but not after divorce. However, this
section has been pre-empted by section 1041. See I.R.C. § 267(g) (2000).
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sale as ordinary income rather than capital gain. 72 This rule
prevents the spouses as a single economic unit from trading a
capital gain taxed at a lower capital gains rate for a
depreciation deduction which would offset ordinary income.
As a result, spouses were sometimes considered a single
economic tax unit, but often were not. These anti-abuse rules
applied equally to spouses in community property and
common law property states.
The distinction between community property and non-
community property states, however, became a burning issue
under the income tax in 1962 with the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Davis.73 In Davis, the Court held
that a divorcing husband's transfer of appreciated property to
his wife triggered a taxable gain to him. Because the Davises
resided in a state in which the wife held no vested rights in
marital property, the transfer of property was thought to
resemble a taxable sale more than a non-taxable division of
jointly owned property.74 Post-Davis litigation established a
rule, eventually adopted by the IRS, that in community
property states as well as in those common law property
states that gave the wife a quasi-vested equitable interest in
marital property, transfers between spouses at divorce would
not be taxable events if they involved essentially equal
divisions of jointly owned assets." But for spouses in all
other states, divorce became a potentially taxable event.
In 1984, Congress remedied the problem for spouses in
those states by enacting section 1041. Under this provision,
no spousal transfer of property, either during marriage or
after a divorce,76 will result in a gain or a loss to the
72. I.R.C. § 1239 (2000).
73. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
74. Mrs. Davis released her marital rights as consideration for the transfer
to her of stock by Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis was taxed as though he had sold the
stock to Mrs. Davis in exchange for the fair market value of her released
marital rights. The spouse who releases marital rights, however, is not taxed
on the transfer. Rev. Rul 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63. While this ruling provides no
rationale for this position, one possibility is that a spouse such as Mrs. Davis is
merely receiving funds that replace her right to support and future inheritance,
both items that she would have been entitled to enjoy tax-free.
75. See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
76. Transfers to ex-spouses are covered by this provision so long as the
transfers are "incident to divorce." I.R.C. § 1041 (2000). The section also
provides that the transferee spouse takes the basis of the transferor spouse,
which ensures that the gain or loss will be recognized upon final disposition by
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transferring spouse. The effect of this provision is to merge
the two individual taxpayers into a single taxable entity in
which transfers are simply accorded no economic effect for tax
purposes.
3. The Problem
The current wealth transfer rules effectively treat all
married couples as a single tax unit. As with joint returns,
which similarly treat spouses as a single unit, the driving
force that led Congress to this solution was the goal of
uniform taxation of spouses who had been taxed differently
under state property law. Thus, under current law, the
problem of geographical differences has been resolved for
spouses.
It is unclear, however, how unmarried couples will be
treated when they dissolve their relationships and enter into
agreements about the division of property. If the pre-1984
law that was applicable to spouses can also apply to
unmarried couples, then those couples who own property
jointly should be able to divide their property when they split
up without facing adverse tax consequences.77 Applying the
same pre-1984 principles developed in litigated cases 78 would
produce a nontaxable division of property no matter whose
name is on the title, at least in those states that accord
certain unmarried couples vested property rights.79 However,
there is no direct authority dealing with unmarried couples,
and so the outcome is less than clear. 0
the transferee spouse. See I.R.C. § 1041(b).
77. And there is no reason to suppose that the rules should be different
simply because a couple is unmarried. The pre-1984 law that was applied to
spouses was derived from rules about joint ownership unrelated to marriage.
Thus, for example, joint owners who partition their joint ownership into
separate ownership interests do not usually recognize gain or loss. The theory
is that there is no realization event in such cases. See Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2
C.B. 507 (partition of one parcel into two parcels); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-27-
069 (July 9, 1993) (holding that Rev. Rul. 56-437 applies to co-tenants who
divide up contiguous co-tenancy parcels into separately owned parcels).
78. See Walz v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935); Carrieres v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.
959 (1975), acq. in result 1976-2 C.B. 1, affd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
79. For example, California grants registered domestic partners the same
vested community property rights as spouses enjoy.
80. But see Reynolds v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M (CCH) 1479 (1999), holding that
an annual payment of $22,000 pursuant to a settlement agreement in which
unmarried cohabitants of twenty-four years agreed that she would release all
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Under estate and gift tax rules, however, the law is clear.
Marital deductions are only available to spouses. Thus,
lifetime gifts and death-time transfers that are above the
exemption amounts81  will trigger transfer taxes for
unmarried couples, and, so long as DOMA remains effective,
will also trigger transfer taxes for same-sex spouses.
Unmarried couples could be treated the same as married
couples provided they have formed a similar economic unit.
Certainly those couples who have registered in states that
recognize domestic partnerships and civil unions on a basis
that is close to marriage would appear to be the sorts of
couples whose transfers should be controlled by section 1041.
To treat such couples as legal strangers under the income tax
law merely gives them the opportunity to create tax
avoidance schemes that are unavailable to spouses82 and
taxes them on transactions that lack true economic
substance. And to treat them as legal strangers under the
estate and gift tax law results in the assessment of a tax on
the transfer of property that, in many cases, the transferee
already owns.83
her claims to his property in exchange for cash payments totaling $153,500 from
him did not produce taxable income to her. The IRS had argued that the
payments were for services. The taxpayer argued that the payments were gifts,
excludable under section 102. The court, however, ruled that the cash
payments were made in exchange for her property interests. Thus any gain
would be a disposition of property gain. Since there was no evidence that the
amount realized exceeded her basis, the court held she had no taxable gain.
While this reasoning resulted in no gain to the taxpayer, it is not based on a
theory of nontaxable division of property.
81. The lifetime exemption for gifts is one million dollars. The exemption
for the estate tax is currently two million dollars. The exemptions must be
cumulated. Thus, a person who makes a lifetime taxable gift of one million
dollars would only have a one million dollar exemption at death for the estate
tax.
82. Professor Theodore Seto has compiled an interesting list of such tax
avoidance techniques and demonstrated how same-sex couples, unrecognized as
family members by the Federal Tax Law, can manipulate tax rules to their
advantage. See Theodore P. Seto, The Assumption of Selfishness in the Internal
Revenue Code: Refraining the Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage,
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-33 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=850645.
83. This problem is particularly acute in the case of property held as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. Section 2040 includes 100% of the joint
property in the estate of the first to die unless the surviving tenant can prove
original contribution. Thus, if A gifts property to B and B uses that gift to
purchase joint tenancy property with A, B (as the beneficiary of A's estate) will
bear the estate tax on 100% of the property at A's death even though she owned
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A fair tax for all families should treat similarly situated
families the same with respect to the taxation of property
transfers. The primary problem in crafting a fair rule is
determining which families or couples are similarly situated.
I will return to this problem in Part V.
C. Support Payments
1. Overview of the Law
All states generally impose some duty on spouses to
support each other.8 4  While this support obligation is
generally not capable of enforcement during the marriage,
divorce law recognizes the obligation and sometimes enforces
the duty to support post-divorce in the form of alimony."5
Federal tax law recognizes this state-imposed obligation of
support and taxes spousal support payments accordingly. For
example, the Internal Revenue Service has long ruled that
payments in satisfaction of a legal obligation of support do not
constitute taxable gifts. 6 In addition, the fact that the wife
was owed a legal obligation of support during the marriage
was a sufficient basis for not taxing her receipt of support as
income after the marriage ended."
Under current tax law, when a marital unit breaks up at
divorce, §§ 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code are
triggered. Under these provisions, payments of alimony are
the property herself for years.
84. See, e.g., Lawhon v. Lawhon, 583 So.2d 776 (Fla. App. 1991)(holding
that support obligation required husband to pay wife's attorneys' fees in divorce
and that obligation could not be waived).
85. The trend, however, in recent years is away from alimony. The Uniform
Marital Dissolution Act states a preference for having post-divorce support
obligations be satisfied out of property divisions. Most studies show that
alimony awards are few (e.g., only ten percent of cases) and often are not
enforced for more than one year. This shift has been criticized by a number of
commentators who point out that husbands continue to have greater earning
power, often enhanced by in-kind support from wives. The best way to prevent
an unjust reward to husbands would be to continue sharing his earnings post-
divorce in the form of alimony payments. See eg., Herma Hill Kay, Equality
and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1 (1987); Christopher D. Nelson, Note, Toward a Compensatory Model of
Alimony in Alaska, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 101 (1995); Jane Rutherford, Duty in
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990).
86. See Rev. Rul. 54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032
(June 1, 1981) (and authorities cited therein).
87. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
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either taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payor, or
they are non-taxable transfers and non-deductible. The
underlying principle is that the now-divided family will only
be taxed once on the income that is used to support its prior
members. This principle is consistent with the notion that
the spousal unit is a single economic unit for federal tax
purposes. 8
There is not much direct law on the taxation of voluntary
support transfers between spouses during a marriage.
Presumably these payments are also controlled by the
principle that income in the family unit should only be taxed
once. But there are additional justifications. Voluntary
support transfers occur between spouses during the marriage,
often as the result of a decision to divide the labor of the
family economic unit. In cases where there are two equal
wage-earners, support transfers will be minimal. But where
one spouse works in the market place and the other stays
home, transfers occur in both directions. The earner provides
goods for the unit that must be purchased in the marketplace
and the stay-at-home spouse provides services. Whether
these transfers result from informal bargaining or from the
expectations of parties to a marriage, they are different from
transfers that occur between unrelated persons in a
commercial setting. These transfers are not income to the
recipient, either because they are gifts, excluded from income
under section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code, or they are
simply fulfillment of legal and societal expectations of what
spouses owe each other. Nor do these transfers constitute
taxable gifts under the gift tax, either because they are
exchanges of relatively equal value or because they are
fulfilling a legal obligation of support.
2. The Problem
Differences in state law have not made major differences
in the taxation of spousal support obligations, perhaps
because states impose fairly similar requirements. And even
where state law has differed, such as in Texas where there
88. See Deborah Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income
Tax Law Applicable to Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX L. REV. 363, 369-71 (2002).
This principle of taxing the family only once is also consistent with the Gould
decision. See Gould, 245 U.S. at 153-54.
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was no state-imposed alimony until 1995,89 the tax rules for
support payments have been applied uniformly despite the
state law differences. 90
Unmarried couples experience two problems regarding
the taxation of support payments. One problem is
uncertainty. The other is unequal treatment. For most
unmarried couples, the law is simply not clear. For
unmarried couples who are subject to a state-imposed
obligation to support their partners, presumably such
payments will be exempt from the gift tax. For other
unmarried couples, the law is clear but unfair. Such
payments do constitute taxable gifts, whether made during
the relationship or post-dissolution. 91
Whether post-dissolution payments of support will be
subject to income taxation in the hands of the recipient is an
open question for all unmarried couples.92 The Internal
Revenue Service has yet to rule on either the gift tax issue or
the income tax issue. It has offered no public guidance,
despite the fact that at least seven states impose support
obligations on registered unmarried couples. 9
89. See James W. Paulsen, The History of Alimony in Texas and the New
Spousal Maintenance Statute, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 151 (1998).
90. See, e.g., Hogg v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 361 (1949) (holding that when a wife
releases her right to support during the marriage in exchange for a promise of
future post-divorce support from her husband, the payments arise because of
the marital relationship and will be taxed the same as court-imposed alimony).
91. The policy justifications for subjecting such payments to the gift tax
seem weak. Such payments are not the sort of "estate depleting" transfers that
the gift tax was intended to reach. Nor do they result in an assignment of
income, which has recently been suggested as an alternative justification for
subjecting transfers of wealth to the gift tax. See Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001) (seeking to repeal the Estate Tax but keep the gift tax to discourage
income shifting gift transfers). Since payments for support are payments for
consumption they do not serve to shift income-producing property from one
taxpayer to another.
92. It would also seem appropriate to exempt the receipt of such payments
from the income tax either under the Gould rationale (which would be available
only to partners subject to state-imposed support obligations) or on the theory
that such payments spring from the intimate personal relationship that, at least
at the formation, was founded on love and affection, or "detached and
disinterested generosity." See Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960)
(holding that transfers that spring from love and affection or from detached and
disinterested generosity are gifts under section 102 of the Code).
93. The states are Vermont, California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New
Hampshire, Oregon, and Maine. When the new Washington statute becomes
effective in June of 2008, it will become the 8th state to impose support
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Finally, all unmarried couples94  who enter into
dissolutions that require one partner to make support
payments to the other will experience unequal tax treatment
on those payments as compared with married couples. The
ability to shift the tax burden on such payments under
sections 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code is only
available for spouses. If these provisions were to be extended
to unmarried couples, the question arises again as to which
unmarried couples should be included. This question will be
addressed in Part V.
III. ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES AND STATE LAW
State recognition of alternative families has taken
several different forms. Initially personal relationships were
recognized in limited situations for limited purposes by
judicial decisions. More recently, state statutes have been
enacted to create state sanctioned statuses for certain
unmarried couples who qualify. Some of these statuses are
very similar to marriage. For the most part they are created
as alternatives to marriage that are made available primarily
to same-sex couples95 who have been excluded from marriage
under other state laws.
A. Marvin v. Marvin
In 1976, the Supreme Court of California recognized the
equitable rights of long term cohabitants when it issued its
opinion in Marvin v. Marvin.6  Since that time legal
professionals who work with separating cohabitants have
relied on the Marvin case to argue that clients have a right to
share in any wealth accumulated during the relationship,
regardless of who has legal title to the wealth. Marvin is also
cited as authority for post-separation support claims to the
obligations on registered unmarried couples. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26..15.205
(as amended).
94. As well as same-sex married couples in Massachusetts due to DOMA.
95. Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (2005),
extends to couples other than same-sex intimate couples, and California's
Registered Domestic Partnership Act, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West
2005), extends to opposite sex couples over the age of 62, as does Washington's
Domestic Partner Law, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.10-.70 (West 2007).
96. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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extent such claims can be based on implied contract or
quantum meruit.
Some legal scholars argued in the Marvin briefs that
unmarried cohabitants should be treated similarly to married
couples when they split up." Under this legal theory, any
property acquired during the marriage would be divided in
the same way that community property is divided upon
divorce of a married couple. The California Supreme Court
rejected this argument, 8 but left room for unmarried couples
to prove that they had privately contracted, either explicitly
or implicitly, to have their relationship be treated the same as
married couples. Upon proof of such a contract, an unmarried
separating couple can be required by state law to divide
property and pay spousal support in the same manner as
divorcing married couples.
While opposite sex couples, such as the Marvins, might
have trouble proving the existence of such a contract, 99 same-
sex couples often explicitly agree to just such an
arrangement. And it is more likely that same-sex couples, as
compared with opposite sex cohabitants, will admit at the
time the relationship dissolves that they had such a contract
whether explicit or implicit. This consequence is more likely
because same sex couples cannot marry, yet they form
relationships that mirror marriage. Often their expectations
are that, if they separate, they will be subject to support and
property division rules that are similar to those applied to
divorcing couples. 10
97. Pre-Marvin cases in California had granted community property rights
to putative spouses and similarly situated unmarried partners. For a
discussion of Marvin and the pre-Marvin cases, see Herma Hill Kay & Carol
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977).
98. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 120 ("No language in the Family Law Act
addresses the property rights of nonmarital partners, and nothing in the
legislative history of the act suggests that the Legislature considered that
subject. The delineation of the rights of nonmarital partners before 1970 had
been fixed entirely by judicial decision; we see no reason to believe that the
Legislature, by enacting the Family Law Act, intended to change that state of
affairs.").
99. In fact, Michelle Marvin was unable to prove that she and Lee Marvin
had an agreement to share assets and support each other. Thus she was not
entitled to the rehabilitative alimony award that a trial court had awarded.
Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal Ct. App. 1981).
100. Gay and lesbian couples are likely to turn to mediation rather than
courts when they dissolve their relationships out of fear that courts will not
apply rules that acknowledge their relationships. For a discussion of gay and
20081
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Since 1976, most states have adopted the Marvin rule.
Illinois is the primary exception. 10 1  Some states require
explicit contracts before co-habitant agreements will be
enforceable as to property rights.1 2 Some states require that
such contracts be in writing. 10 3  The remaining states are
willing to consider equitable claims by partners to property
acquired during the relationship on the basis of implied
agreements. Whether these equitable claims can amount to
property rights that are sufficiently vested to be recognized as
such under federal tax law remains an open question. 0 4
B. Washington's Meretricious Relationship Rule
One state court has adopted the rule that some advocates
had advanced in Marvin, namely that unmarried cohabitants
be treated similarly to married couples. In Marriage of
Lindsey, °5 the Washington Supreme Court recognized the
legal status of a heterosexual couple engaged in a
lesbian mediation in family law matters see Betsy Walters, Lesbian Mediation,
41 Fam.. Ct. Rev. 104 at 111-115 (2003).
101. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (holding that it is
against public policy to enforce cohabitant agreements because cohabitation is
against public policy; marriage is the preferred relationship). No same-sex case
has directly challenged Hewitt, although it is difficult to apply its public policy
rationale (i.e., support of marriage) to a case involving a same-sex couple who
cannot marry in any event. But see Scott v. Comm'r, 226 F.3d 871, 874-76 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that survivor of lesbian relationship had not proved
ownership of property acquired during relationship under resulting trust
theory, and implicitly recognizing that unmarried couples may rely only on
resulting trust theories rather than contract theories to assert shared
ownership of property acquired during the relationship).
102. See Morone v. Morone, 407 N.E.2d 438, 439 (N.Y. 1980).
103. At least three states require a written contract when the consideration
is nonmarital conjugal cohabitation: Florida,. See Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d
759, 762 (1997) (dictum), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2008),
and Texas, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 2008).
104. Reynolds v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M (CCH) 1479 (1999) (holding that for
unmarried opposite sex cohabitants, annual payments made pursuant to a
settlement agreement were made in exchange for the taxpayer's equitable
rights in the property of her cohabitant, and as such, they were taxable only to
the extent they exceeded her basis in the property). The court assumed that the
cash payments did not exceed basis and thus there was not gain. The court
acknowledged that it did not have full information about basis, but assumed
that she acquired her interest in the property via gift and thus that basis was
computed under §1015. In cases of appreciating property, however, a section
1015 basis would likely result in gain. I have been unable to find any other
cases or rulings in which the tax consequences of property divisions between
unmarried cohabitants is an issue.
105. Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
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meretricious relationship and declared that the state's
community property laws would be applied upon the
dissolution of the relationship in the same fashion as if the
couple had been married. That judicial rule has been
extended to same-sex couples. °6 The rule has recently been
extended to apply to a deceased couple, splitting the property
acquired by one partner between the two of them at the
moment of death, in the same way that community property
would have been treated.0 7
Given this extension of the rule to divide property at the
moment of death between two deceased partners, even before
any creditors can reach the assets of the titled partner, the
equitable rights of the non-titled partner appear substantial.
It is at least arguable that for estate tax purposes, such
property should be treated the same as jointly owned or true
community property, i.e., only half of the property should be
included in the taxable estate of each partner.
C. Civil Unions, Marriage and Domestic Partnership
As of March 1, 2008, there are ten states that grant
statewide recognition to same-sex unions. Massachusetts is
the only state that recognizes same-sex marriage.10 8 Seven
other states, California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, 10 9 and Washington grant a broad
array of rights and responsibilities to same-sex partners. In
all of these states, other than New Hampshire and
Washington (which have no state income tax), partners file
state income taxes jointly. The same is true for same-sex
married couples in Massachusetts.
Until recently, California was unique as the only
community property state to have included unmarried
Registered Domestic Partners (RDPs) in its community
property regime. Washington became the second community
property state to adopt community property rights for RDPs.
Washington, however, has no state income tax. The
community property regime in California creates distinctive
106. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737-38 (Wash. 2001) (en banc),
Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
107. Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 357 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
108. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass.
2003).
109. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002).
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issues for California RDPs as they navigate the income tax
reporting requirements at both the federal and the state level
because the federal and state rules for reporting community
income are different. For this reason, I will discuss the
California situation separately below.
Finally, there are two additional states - Hawaii and
Maine - that have adopted a special status for same sex
couples. In Hawaii, the status is known as "reciprocal
beneficiaries"" ° and the rights extend primarily to property
rights such as inheritance, including the right of a surviving
partner to an elective share upon the death of the other
partner. In Maine the relationships are called "domestic
partnerships." Under Maine law, domestic partners are
jointly responsible for each other's common welfare."' They
are given status as heirs of each other under the intestacy
statutes, but are not given an elective share. 2
D. California's Registered Domestic Partnership Law
The California legislature passed the first state-wide
registered domestic partner law in 1999."' It extended only a
handful of benefits to registered partners. A registry of such
domestic partnerships has been maintained by the Secretary
of State since 2000. Additional, but still minimal, benefits
were extended to registered partners by subsequent
legislative enactments in 2001." 4
On September 19, 2003, the Governor of the State of
110. Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2005).
111. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 1-201(10-A) (2008).
112. In every state except Georgia, there are probate statutes that prevent a
spouse from disinheriting the other spouse at death. These statutes generally
give a spouse who has not been sufficiently provided for in the will of the
deceased spouse the right to claim an "elective share" of the deceased's estate.
Elective share amounts range from one-quarter of the probate estate to one half
of all property controlled by the decedent at death. See, eg., UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-201-214 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 101-32 (1998). Elective shares
provide more protection for financially interdependent partners that do
intestacy provisions.
113. Domestic Partners (AB 26), ch. 588, 1999 Cal. Stat. 3372 (1999) (codified
as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 1999)).
114. For a good discussion of the history of this early legislation, see Grace
Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: the
2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in
Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555,
1558 (2004).
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California signed into law Assembly Bill 205 (AB 205),115
amending California Family Code (CFC) section 297.5. As
amended, CFC section 297.5(a) reads as follows:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights,
protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law,
whether they derive from statutes, administrative
regulations, court rules, government policies, common law,
or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to
and imposed upon spouses.
This provision, by extending spousal rights and
responsibilities, created a community property regime for
registered domestic partners in California that is exactly the
same as the community property regime for spouses. 16 As a
result of these statutory changes, the earned income of
domestic partners qualifies as community income, as does
income from all community assets. These changes became
effective on January 1, 2005."'
The community property regime makes California
different from the other states that currently grant
recognition to same-sex unions. California, like the other
states that grant spousal-like status to same-sex couples,
authorizes RDPs to file joint returns. 1 9 Filing a joint return
115. California Domestic Partners Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003
(AB 205), ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Stat. 2586 (2005) (codified as amended at CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297.5 (West 2003)).
116. It also extended the most significant benefits and burdens of marriage.
Thus, for example, one cannot simply walk away from a partnership
relationship but must obtain a court-supervised dissolution similar to divorce.
Support obligations for partners and children can be awarded post-dissolution
and agreements to alter state-created property rights must conform to the strict
formalities required of spousal agreements.
117. The 2005 law provided: "Earned income may not be treated as
community property for state income tax purposes." CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(g),
repealed by State Income Tax Equity Act of 2006 (S.B. 1827), ch. 802, 2006 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 802 (2006) (effective for tax years beginning in 2007).
I'l The Washington statute, H.B. 3104, was signed by the Governor on March
12, 2008 and has an effective date of June 12, 2008 for most of its provisions. At
that time, RDPs in Washington will begin enjoying community property rights.
119. The California rule is new, effective for tax year 2007. Joint returns for
married same-sex couples are authorized in Massachusetts. Four other states
authorize joint returns for partners in a civil union. They are New Jersey,
Connecticut, Vermont, and Oregon. New Hampshire does not have a state
incomes tax. Nor does Washington. A bill was introduced in Hawaii authorizing
joint returns for reciprocal beneficiaries, but the state taxing authorities have
asked for additional research on its effect since Hawaii, like these other states,
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at the state level when the federal government requires the
filing of a single return creates complexity for all same-sex
partners who face this dilemma of different filing statuses.
That is because state tax rules tend to follow federal tax
rules. A taxpayer usually begins computation of state tax
liability by using his or her adjusted gross income as
computed on the federal tax form. States, in turn, verify
reported income by cross-checking amounts reported to the
federal government. For taxpayers with complicated returns,
this different reporting status can create computational
problems and add to the cost of filing taxes. To minimize the
problem, married couples in Massachusetts are often advised
to file at the state level as married filing separately, rather
than married filing jointly. This option maintains the
separate income and deduction items on each spouse's state
return, which will be the same income and deductions
reported on the federal return. That solution is not available
for California RDPs. While they are free to file as married
filing separately at the state level, they are not able to report
their separate income and deductions from the federal
returns. The community property rules require that
California partners split all earned income equally between
the two partners when reporting income for tax purposes.
This is the traditional result, applying the rule of Poe v.
Seaborn. The federal taxing authorities, however, have
stated that the splitting of community personal service
income will not be allowed at the federal level. 2 ° As a result
RDPs must complete their two federal returns filing as single
taxpayers and they must complete a mock federal joint return
to serve as the basis for their state return.12 1  In sum,
relies on federal tax computations for their state returns. See Reciprocal
Beneficiaries: Hearing on HB 2456 Relating to Taxation Before the H. Comm. On
Judiciary, 2008 Leg., 24th. Sess. (Haw. 2008), (testimony of Kurt Kawafuchi,
Dir. of Taxation, State of Hawaii Dep't of Taxation), available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2008/Testimony/HB2456_JUD_01-25-
08_.pdf. The fact that reciprocal beneficiaries cannot file jointly at the federal
level may, in the view of the state taxing authorities, create undesirable
complexities at the state level. See id.
120. See CCA 200608038, discussed at pp 136-138, infra.
121. For a good discussion of the problems same-sex couples in states like
Massachusetts and California face, see Eva Rosenberg, Giant Tax Headaches
for Gay Couples,
http'//articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Taxes/PreparationTips/GiantTaxHeadach
esForGayCouples.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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California taxpayers are at a unique disadvantage caused by
the conflict between federal and state tax rules. The conflict
has also created significant burdens on the state Franchise
Tax Board.
E. The Problem for Partners: A Summary
Ten states now give state-wide recognition to same-sex
partners who register under the relevant state statutes.
Other states are considering creating alternative statuses. 122
In some of these states, registered couples are required to file
joint income tax returns. Furthermore, they are required to
report taxable transactions on their state returns the way
they would have reported them on the federal return if they
had been married for federal tax purposes. For these
partners, different tax rules apply to the same transaction,
depending on whether they are filing federal or state returns.
This clash between federal and state recognition of partners
leads to confusion and an undue amount of complexity. 123 In
some cases, it is simply impossible to determine what the
correct tax rule is at the federal level since there are no
specific laws covering same-sex couples whose status is
recognized at the state level. This uncertainty makes the
federal law hard to administer on a uniform basis. Those
122. Bills have been introduced in a number of.states including Illinois, H.B.
1826, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg, Sess. (Ill. 2007), and New York, Assemb. B.
2021, 230th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007). In addition, there is
litigation pending in Iowa, New York, and Connecticut that could result in
recognition of same-sex relationships. See Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965, 2007
WL 2468667 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007) (Trial Order); Martinez v. County of
Monroe, 850 N.Y.S. 2d 740, 743-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that same-sex
Canadian marriages are entitled to recognition under New York law); Kerrigan
v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. 2006)(upholding state marriage law
restricted to opposite sex couples), currently on appeal to the State Supreme
Court.
123. Consider for example a California RDP in which one partner sells a fifty
percent interest in her home to her partner. Under federal tax law, if the sale
produces a gain, she must report the gain to the extent it exceeds her $250,000
exemption. Her partner will have a cost basis in the purchased interest. At the
state level, applying the federal rules that apply to spouses in such a situation,
there is no gain or loss. The selling partner will report no gain on her state
return and presumably still has $250,000 worth of exclusion that can be used on
this home when she sells her other half interest. The purchasing partner will
have lower carryover basis rather than cost basis and will have to maintain
records of the two different basis amounts in order to compute gain when she
ultimately sells her interest in the home. She will have a higher gain at the
state level when she does sell because of the lower carryover basis.
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taxpayers with advisors who are willing to make return
decisions by analogizing to rules that have been applied to
spouses in the past will take one position 2 4 and those
taxpayers with advisors who are unwilling to take
advantageous positions for their clients without direct
authority will take a different position.'25
IV. FEDERAL TAXATION AND STATE LAW
A. Summary of the Past
As discussed in Part II of this article, federal tax law has
traditionally relied on state law to define property rights
while federal tax law has determined how those property
rights should be taxed. Since 1930, when the Supreme Court
handed down its opinion in Poe v. Seaborn, state community
property law has determined the allocation of income and
deductions of the parties who make up the community.
2 6
This deference to state property law is not confined to
community property regimes. In Morgan v. Commissioner, 27
for example, state law was the basis for determining whether
a power of appointment was a general power of appointment
for purposes of federal estate taxation. Blair v.
Commissioner 12 applied Illinois trust law to determine the
validity of an assignment of an interest in a trust, relying on
the "bundle of rights" transferred under Illinois law to hold
that the assignment was of a property interest and not
merely an assignment of income. State property law has been
used to determine whether interests exchanged qualified as
like kind under section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. 29
124. E.g., they might exclude post-dissolution support payments from the
income of the recipient on the authority of the reasoning in Gould v. Gould, 245
U.S. 151 (1917).
125. E.g., they might report post-dissolution support payments as taxable
income to the recipient because there is no specific exclusionary rule and section
61 purports to include such payments in income.
126. See United States. v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 194-96 (1971) (holding that
Louisiana spouse is taxed on fifty percent of husband's income despite the fact
that she never benefited from the income).
127. Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
128. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
129. Oregon Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 192, 197 (1953) (finding that the
right to cut timber is personal under Oregon law and thus does not qualify for
like-exchange under §1031); Comm'r v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181, 181 (5th Cir.
1941), affg 42 B.T.A. 490 (1940) (applying Louisiana law to find that mineral
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And the right of a co-owner of property to deduct one hundred
percent of property taxes paid has been held to depend on
whether state law assesses the tax against the entire
property or the undivided interest held by the payor. 130 These
are just some of the examples in which state law has affected
the calculation of federal tax liability.
Property ownership rules under state law also determine
what property is available for the collection of delinquent
taxes. Under section 6321, a tax lien can attach only to
property that belongs to the delinquent taxpayer. 131 While
there has been some confusion about the role of state law in
determining when the IRS can assert a valid tax lien, the
correct understanding is that state property law determines
ownership rights, which must be present for the lien to
attach, whereas state debtor-creditor law does not apply.132
This means the IRS can reach ownership interests in
homesteads, 33  community property,3  tenancy by the
entireties property, 35 and spendthrift trusts 136 even though
state creditors cannot. But if the taxpayer does not own the
property under state law, no federal lien can attach. As a
result, state characterization rules that make property held
in the non-taxpayer spouse's name community property
would be reachable by the IRS for the tax debts of the
rights and real property are both realty for like-kind exchange purposes).
130. See James v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1420 (1995). Under
Pennsylvania law property taxes on jointly owned property are assessed
separately against each owner and so if one owner pays the tax in full he can
only deduct his pro rata share. A different rule applies where the tax is
assessed against the property as a whole and can be sold for payment thereby
putting each owner at risk of loss for any nonpayment. See I.R.C. § 164 (2000).
131. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000) ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
person, belonging to such person.").
132. For a full explanation of this point see Steve R. Johnson, Why Craft Isn't
Scary, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 439 (2002).
133. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983) (involving Texas
homestead law which would have prevented a forced sale of the home by state
creditors).
134. United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d. 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (Washington
community property could be reached by IRS for pre-marital debt even though
under state law it would have been protected from creditors holding such debts).
135. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (involving Michigan law
which recognized ownership rights but protected the property interest from
creditors).
136. See Bank One Ohio Trust v. United States, 80 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 1996).
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taxpayer spouse. 137
B. A Break from the Past
Despite a long tradition of looking to state law to
determine family relationships and ownership of property
rights, federal tax law has taken a new course of action in
response to state-recognition of same-sex unions. Two
examples of this new direction are (1) Congressional
enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act, and (2) the refusal
by the Internal Revenue Service to follow the rule of Poe v.
Seaborn with respect to the community property of California
RDPs.
1. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
The federal part of the Defense of Marriage Act states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is
a husband or a wife. 138
a. Application of DOMA to Federal Tax Law
The plain meaning of DOMA is that for federal tax
purposes, same-sex spouses will be excluded from all tax rules
that apply to spouses. Thus, Massachusetts same-sex
spouses cannot file joint returns, whether such filing would
create a marriage penalty or bonus and they cannot rely on
section 1041 to determine the tax consequences of inter-
spousal transfers. Sections 71 and 215 will not apply to post-
divorce alimony. Transfers at death will be subject to the
estate tax without application of the marital deduction.
In addition, a host of anti-abuse rules applicable to
spouses will not apply to Massachusetts same-sex spouses.
Thus, such spouses could create artificial tax losses by selling
loss property to each other. Sections 267 and 1041 would
prevent the recognition of such losses for sales between
137. See McPhee v. I.R.S., No. 00-CV-2028-D, 2002 WL 147743 (N.D. Tex.
July 5, 2002) (applying Texas community property law).
138. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
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opposite-sex spouses. Another possibility for same-sex
spouses would be for one spouse to sell greatly appreciated
property to the other spouse on the installment method, with
the payment of the note delayed for many years. No gain
would be recognized until the installment note is paid. The
purchasing spouse would receive the benefit of cost basis
equal to the property's current fair market value and could
turn around and sell the property on the open market at its
current value for no tax gain. As a result, the couple would
have the cash and no tax bill. This arrangement would not be
possible for opposite-sex spouses because section 1041(b)
would prevent the purchasing spouse from receiving a step-up
in basis and thus the sale to a third party would produce a
taxable gain.139
The same-sex couple would also avoid certain marriage
tax penalties. If both spouses are employed and earn roughly
equal income, then they will pay fewer income taxes by being
able to file as single taxpayers rather than married ones. If
one or both spouses receive social security benefits as well as
other income, then the taxable amounts under section 86 will
be lower for the same-sex spouses than for opposite-sex
spouses.140  The limitation on mortgage interest deductions
also creates a penalty for spouses. Two single taxpayers (or
two same-sex spouses) can claim interest deductions on debt
of $2.2 million secured by four different homes, whereas
spouses would be limited to debt of $1.1 million and no more
than two homes.' 4 '
It is not clear whether DOMA would impact all federal
tax rules regarding payment of spousal support obligations.
DOMA would apply to deny same-sex spouses the benefit of
statutes and rulings and regulations which by their terms
139. In addition, section 453(e) would deny the benefit of this abuse
transaction to other close family members because the sale for cash by the
second family member would trigger immediate gain to the first family member.
140. The base amount, above which social security benefits may be subject to
taxation, is $25,000 for each same-sex spouse and $32,000 for a married couple
filing jointly. The base amount is adjusted gross income plus fifty percent of
social security benefits. Thus, for example, if spouse A and B each have $24,000
in social security benefits and $13,000 in other income, and if they were taxed
as single, neither would exceed the $25,000 base amount and no social security
benefits would be taxed. But, if they were taxed as married (filing jointly), then
they exceed the base amount by $18,000 and a portion of their social security
benefits will be taxed.
141. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2000).
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apply to spouses. Thus, for example, it is clear that sections
71 and 215 cannot apply to payments of alimony by divorcing
same-sex spouses, because those statutes apply only to
"spouses." The law that has developed around state-imposed
obligations of support, however, is not restricted to spouses.
Support obligations are also imposed to require parents to
support their minor children. Payment of support to a minor
child is not a taxable gift and it is not taxable income to the
child. The argument that support payments are not taxable
gifts under IRS rulings 4 2 or taxable income under Gould does
not have to rely on spousal status, but only on the validity of
the state-imposed obligation. Thus, DOMA should have no
effect on these tax rules.
It has been suggested by some that the IRS might rely on
DOMA to deny the reality of state imposed support
obligations and property rights to partners in civil unions and
domestic partnerships. DOMA's potential application to tax
rules regarding spousal support has already been addressed.
For the same reasons, DOMA should not affect the tax
treatment of state-required support payments between non-
spousal partners. A similar argument applies to property
rights. Federal tax law recognizes state property law
generally, whether the property is marital property or
another form of jointly owned property.
But there is another reason DOMA should not apply to
civil unions and domestic partnerships. Partners in civil
unions and domestic partnerships are not married; they are
not spouses. Thus, DOMA does not apply to them. 4 3 Under a
plain meaning construction, DOMA only disregards the state-
created marital status of same-sex partners; it does not say
that federal law will disregard other state-created rights of
same-sex partners.
142. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (no taxable gift because of
support obligation); Rev. Rul. 54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318 (taxable gift because no
support obligation).
143. See Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Cal Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that registered domestic partners are not spouses); Smelt v. County of
Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that registered domestic partners
do not have standing to challenge DOMA because, in part, they are not
spouses); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200524016 (June 17, 2005) and I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200524017 (June 17, 2005) (both of which appear to conclude that
California Registered Domestic Partners are not spouses under DOMA).
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b. Critique of DOMA's Application to Federal Tax
Law
While the federal government clearly has the power to
define spouse for federal tax purposes, it has never done so
before. The fact that it has chosen to do so in this one
instance, without giving much scrutiny to the consequences,
is suspect. The alleged purpose of DOMA is to advance four
governmental interests: (1) defending and nurturing the
institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage; (2)
defending traditional notions of morality; (3) protecting state
sovereignty and democratic self-governance; and (4)
preserving scarce government resources.1'
There are strong arguments that none of these four
interests is sufficiently furthered by the tax law's
nonrecognition of same-sex marriages. First of all, the third
interest, protecting state sovereignty, seems irrelevant to the
federal portion of DOMA under which the federal rule trumps
state rules. This interest is presumably intended as a
justification for the other provision in DOMA, that states will
not be required under full faith and credit to honor same-sex
marriages from other states.
The second interest, defending morality, is, after the
Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans,45 questionable.
In Romer, the Court said: "Moral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal
Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be
"drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened
by the law." 46
Finally, it is not clear how the exclusion of same-sex
spouses is rationally related to accomplishing goal one,
defending heterosexual marriage, or goal four, protecting
scarce government resources. If marriage created only tax
benefits, one might see a nexus between limiting the
beneficial rules to heterosexual couples and defending their
marriages. However, as this article has tried to show, the tax
law has become attuned to the financial interdependencies of
married couples over time and has developed special rules
144. See H.R. REP. 104-664, at 12-18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2916-22.
145. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
146. Id. at 633; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582-83 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that attempt to tax them correctly, but not necessarily by
giving them benefits. Indeed, often the special tax rules for
spouses create burdens.147 It could turn out that taxing same-
sex spouses as married couples under the current joint return
rules would produce more, rather than less, tax revenue. 148
In other words, DOMA may actually serve to reduce scarce
government resources.
2. Chief Counsel Advice 200608038
The IRS issued this Chief Counsel Advice memorandum
(CCA) in early 2006 to announce that the Seaborn income
splitting rule would not be applied to California RDPs. The
rationale offered was that the rule had never been applied to
anyone other than spouses. This rationale is merely
descriptive. It does not provide a reasoned justification for
different treatment of RDPs.
a. Effect of CCA 200608038
Read narrowly, the CCA only addresses the taxation of
community income that is earned by one of the partners.
That is, it says nothing about passive income such as rents or
dividends on community property. Nor does it address any of
the other issues in which community property
characterization is crucial in determining tax consequences.
Questions abound, such as whether creation of community
property is a taxable event, whether or not community
property ownership will be honored by the IRS when the
property is ultimately divided at dissolution or death, and
whether payments out of community property bank accounts
for deductible items will be viewed as paid by both partners
or just by the partner whose earnings funded the account.
The answers to all of these community property tax
questions are provided for spouses in a fourteen page IRS
147. See, eg., Seto, supra note 82 (describing all of the ways that same sex
spouses, by escaping taxation as spouses, can actually benefit from the tax law
or manipulate its rules to their advantage).
148. It is very difficult' to measure marriage bonuses and penalties
accurately. One study, based on the 1999 tax year found that of the 51.4 million
joint returns filed that year, forty-eight percent experienced a marriage penalty
and forty-one percent experienced a bonus. The aggregate net penalty was $1.6
billion. See Nicholas Bull et al., Defining and Measuring Marriage Penalties and
Bonuses, OTA Paper 82-Revised, (Nov. 1999) available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota82 revised.pdf.
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publication. 149  In May of 2007, the Service edited this
publication by adding the following language in a prominent
place on page two:
California domestic partners. If you are a registered
domestic partner in California, the rules discussed in this
publication for reporting community income do not apply
to you. You must report all wages, salaries, and other
compensation received for your personal services on your
own return.
This publication addresses the reporting of income from
property as well as from wages, gains and losses on the
disposition of property, income from partnerships, the
allocation of deductions, and many other questions that might
arise for taxpayers who are subject to a community property
regime. The excerpt above is the only reference to RDPs. By
negative implication one might conclude that all of the rules
in Publication 555 do apply to RDPs, other than the income
splitting rule for personal service compensation.
b. Critique
In Poe v. Seaborn, the Supreme Court held that income
should be taxed to the person who owns the income.
Seaborn's authority has not been seriously questioned, either
by the Service or by the courts for more than seventy-five
years. Recent cases have focused on whether the income-
splitting rule should be available to spouses from certain
foreign countries with community property regimes. 150 And,
as recently as 1987, the Service ruled that Wisconsin's
marital property regime was subject to the income splitting
rules of Seaborn.151
Under California state law, community income, including
income from wages and salaries, is owned equally by the two
spouses or the two RDPs. The CCA brushes this holding
aside by claiming that income splitting has never been
applied to anyone other than spouses. That is true only
149. I.R.S., Publication 555, (May 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p555.pdf.
150. Westerdahl v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 83 (1984) (spouse from Sweden, income
splitting allowed); Angerhofer v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 814 (1986) (spouse from
Germany, wife was not sufficiently vested in community earnings of husband
under German law to allow income splitting under Seaborn).
151. See Rev. Rul. 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 20.
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because no state has ever vested ownership rights to earned
income in unmarried partners before. But now California has
done that and the California law is not a sham like the law of
Oklahoma which gave spouses the right to opt into the
community property regime. In 1944, the Supreme Court
held that the Oklahoma law was insufficient to vest spouses
with ownership rights that allowed them to split income
under Seaborn.'52 The CCA relies on this Oklahoma case to
deny income splitting to RDPs, pointing out that the Court
there concluded: "The important fact is that the community
system of Oklahoma is not a system, dictated by State policy,
as an incident of matrimony."'53 The importance of this
language is not that property systems must be an incident of
matrimony to be recognized, but that they must be part of a
system dictated by the state. Spouses in Oklahoma could opt
into the community property system if they wanted to, but
those that did not opt in remained married and enjoyed all
other benefits of marriage. Under California law, RDPs are
mandatorily subject to the community property regime. 154 For
them, community property is part of a single system and not
an option they can elect or reject while retaining the rest of
the rights and obligations in the system.
While I believe the CCA is wrong-headed, 55 there may,
however, be a possible justification for treating RDPs
different from spouses with respect to earned income.
Spouses file as married taxpayers using the joint or married
filing separate rate structures. RDPs, who are not spouses,
file as single taxpayers. Since most spouses file jointly, the
splitting of earned income is irrelevant to their tax liability.
Those who file as married filing separately will split their
income, but will be subjected to the higher tax brackets for
152. Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
153. Memorandum from the Office of Chief Counsel, I.R.S. 200608038, at 4
(Feb. 24, 2006) available at http'//www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0608038.pdf (quoting
Harmon, 323 U.S. at 48).
154 Spouses and partners can transmute community property into separate
property in California, but to do so they must follow the specific rules that are
part of the state's community property system. Thus they are not able to elect
out of the system as Oklahoma spouses could do.
155. For additional arguments critiquing the CCA, see Patricia A. Cain,
Relitigating Seaborn, Taxing the Community Income of California Registered
Domestic Partners, 111 TAX NOTES 561 (2006); and Dennis J. Ventry Jr., No
Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How the IRS Erred, 110 TAX NOTES
1221 (2006).
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that filing status. Yet for RDPs, who must file under the
lower single taxpayer rates, at the federal level, the ability to
split would, in the case of partners with very disproportionate
incomes, normally create a tax benefit.
This possible justification might be a sufficient basis for
Congress to enact a special rule for RDPs, comparable to the
rule under section 879, applicable to couples that include a
non-resident alien spouse. In such cases the earned
community income is attributed to the spouse who earns it.
This special legislative rule is necessary to reverse the
Seaborn rule that all community income is taxed to the
members of the community because they are the "owners" of
the income. But the reversal of Seaborn should come from
Congress, not from the IRS.
There are other problems with the CCA. It is silent as to
any tax issue other than who reports the earned community
income. Tax return preparers, family lawyers, and estate
planners all appear to have a wide variety of opinions about
how to interpret this CCA. At its narrowest, it can be
interpreted to mean that partners must report their own
earned income even though it is community income, but all
other consequences of Poe v. Seaborn still apply. At its
broadest, it can be interpreted to mean that the IRS will not
recognize the community property rights of California RDPs,
and thus none of the consequences of Poe v. Seaborn would
apply to RDPs. While I think there is no basis for
interpreting the CCA broadly, the IRS has been extremely
unhelpful in clarifying its position. So far it has issued no
public ruling, and it has refused to answer questions raised in
a private letter ruling request. 156
The failure of the IRS to address the community property
question for RDPs is not only inconsistent with its treatment
of community property spouses, but it also creates an
unacceptable level of uncertainty for RDP taxpayers. This
uncertainty creates further costs for RDPs as they try to
comply with the federal tax law.
V. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION
This article has identified a number of different problems
that the current tax law creates for same-sex couples,
156. For a description of this problem see Cain, supra note 151.
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whether their relationships are recognized under state law or
not. Current law, if applied accurately to reflect the
differences among state laws, would result in a lack of
uniformity reminiscent of the time before enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1948. This lack of uniformity is particularly
clear now that California and Washington have extended
community property rights to Registered Domestic Partners.
But, putting aside the special problems created by community
property, the failure of the federal government to provide
reasonable guidance to all same-sex partners who must file
tax returns in the face of uncertain rules is in total conflict
with principles of good tax administration. The current
administration appears committed to remaining silent about
the tax treatment of same-sex couples, perhaps out of fear
that any pronouncement might seem to support such
relationships. 157
Applying current law, however, would not be adequate
even under the most positive interpretations of existing rules.
While it would be possible, for example, to apply pre-section
1041 law to community property divisions upon dissolutions
for RDPs, it is not clear that same-sex couples in other states
would receive the same benefit since their rights in marital
property are not necessarily vested fifty-fifty. And while
recognition of state-imposed obligations of support would
prevent the levy of a gift tax on support transfers in those
states where such obligations are imposed, the determination
of what constitutes support during an ongoing relationship is
an indeterminate and messy endeavor.
DOMA is another consideration. Massachusetts same-
sex spouses could currently enjoy the certainty of the tax
rules that are applied to spouses generally were if not for
DOMA. And Treasury and the IRS are not free to apply
specific spousal tax rules to same-sex partners by analogy so
long as DOMA is on the books.
Thus, the only satisfactory solution is a federal legislative
one. The legislative response could take several forms, but, in
its ideal state, it would repeal at least the federal portion of
157. I, along with other lawyers, have asked the IRS to issue rulings, public
and private, to provide answers to a number of the tax questions prompted by
RDP community property ownership in California. No rulings have been issued
and the only public statement by the IRS is restricted to the tax treatment of
personal service income. See Cain, supra note 151.
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DOMA.
The best way to create broad reform would be to adopt
one uniform set of rules that would apply to all financially
interdependent couples, whether married or not, and whether
recognized as couples by state law or not. While that is my
preferred approach, and the one I will address at the end of
this section, narrower alternatives are also worth considering.
A. The Section by Section Approach
Nancy Polikoff has suggested that the right way to
determine whether particular statutes should be applied to
spouses or other types of family arrangements would be to
determine the purpose of the statutory provision and then
scrutinize the classification. For example, if the elective
share in probate codes is justified to prevent the
disinheritance of dependent spouses, then dependency ought
to be the determinative factor for application of the section,
rather than marriage. Or, if the purpose of a statute is to
address the needs of children, then a classification based on
parenthood would be more appropriate than one based on
marriage. 59
A similar approach could be used to analyze each tax
statute that makes a distinction based on marital status.
While it would take an inordinate amount of time to review
all such statutes, some key ones come to mind and suggest
immediate Congressional review. For example, sections 105,
106, and 125 of the Internal Revenue Code encourage
employers to provide health care coverage to their employees
and the employee's family members by exempting the benefit
of coverage from income taxation. Sections 105 and 125
explicitly grant this tax exemption to benefits that run to the
employee, the employee's spouse, and the employee's
dependents. But in the early 1990s, employers began to
understand that some of their unmarried employees deserved
similar coverage for their partners. We now have thousands
of such employer health plans throughout the country that
offer domestic partner benefits. The purpose of the tax
exclusion is to encourage the provision of health plans that
159. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 126 (Beacon Press 2008).
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will ultimately cover more and more Americans. I can think
of no policy justification for making the tax benefit of such
plans dependent on marriage. To do so merely frustrates the
primary purpose of extending coverage. Taxing the benefit
may discourage the inclusion of domestic partners. But, more
tellingly, treating plan beneficiaries differently imposes costs
on employers who might, as a result, have second thoughts
about offering such plans. These provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code should be amended to exempt from income all
employer-provided health care benefits, including those to
domestic partners.16 °
Another rule that deserves early review under a section-
by-section approach is the rule that subjects support
payments to non-dependents to the gift tax. The purpose of
the gift tax used to be to back up the estate tax. To the extent
that is still the purpose, payments for support result in
immediate consumption and are not the sort of wealth
transfers that the estate tax is designed to cover. With the
recent changes to the estate and gift tax, especially with the
increase of the estate tax exemption and the decoupling of
that exemption from the gift tax, the purpose of the gift tax
has shifted. Now the justification for a lower gift tax
exemption is that its purpose is to protect the progressivity of
the income tax rates. In other words, gifts can shift income to
lower bracket taxpayers. Thus, the argument goes, we need
to retain a gift tax to discourage such transfers. But
payments to support another person are not shifting income
because there is no income-producing wealth transfer. In
view of the purpose of the gift tax, it makes little sense to
have a rule that exempts support payments to spouses but
not support payments to ageing parents, domestic partners,
or adult children who come upon hard times. This is a rule
where the bright line of marriage certainly needs to be
reconsidered. 161
160. Such a bill has been introduced. Tax Equity for Domestic Partner and
Health Plan Beneficiaries Act, S. 1556, 110th Cong. (2007).
161. For a more detailed development of this argument, see Patricia A. Cain,
Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 97, 125
(1991).
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B. Adopt Spousal Treatment for Couples in State-Recognized
Relationships
Another possible solution for same-sex couples would be
to extend spousal treatment to those couples whose
relationships are recognized under state law. The primary
argument for this solution is that the property sharing rules
and the support obligations that are imposed by state law on
same-sex domestic partnerships and civil unions are a
justificatory basis for treating them the same as spouses
under the federal tax law. Such rules are indications that the
couples are operating as a single economic unit and should be
taxed as such. Arguments against this solution include the
following:
1. This solution leads to the same lack of unity that
federal tax law experienced when it recognized
community property regimes for tax purposes.
Uniform treatment of all taxpayers, no matter
what state they reside in, is a desirable goal.
2. It is not always clear which attributes of marriage
are the most important for determining whether a
couple should be taxed as a single economic unit.
Hawaii, for example, appears to impose claims to
property, but not necessarily claims to support.
And even in those states where support
obligations are imposed, it is very difficult to
determine the meaning of those obligations. Tax
law considers support to include payments well
beyond the old common law doctrine of necessities.
Should any obligation of support justify single
economic treatment for tax purposes or would the
federal taxing authorities need to investigate the
nature of the support obligation in each state?
This sort of state-by-state determination of
spousal equivalency would also place a burden on
the Internal Revenue Service.
C. A Uniform and Equitable Solution
The only way to attain true uniformity across state lines
and to provide equitable tax treatment for all families would
be for the tax law to do something totally new: ignore state
marital property law and instead create a federal definition of
domestic partnership for tax purposes. The federal definition
2008]
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could create uniform rules regarding allocation of income and
deductions or it could allow partners to create their own
allocations. Whatever rules were adopted, they would have to
be enforced consistently during the relation, upon dissolution
and at death. That is, they would need economic substance. 162
And to erase the marriage tax penalty, they would have to be
applied equally to spouses as well as domestic partners.
Tax rules akin to existing rules applied to spouses should
apply to the formation and dissolution of such partnerships.
That is, there should be no tax consequences at either point in
time. The partnership should be viewed as a single entity.
When wealth is transferred in or out of the entity, the tax
consequences (e.g., gain, loss, deduction) should affect the
entity and not the individuals. In effect, the domestic
partnership would be taxed in a manner similar to business
partnerships, with tax consequences computed at the entity
level and the net gain or loss distributed out to the two
partners for them to report on their own tax returns. Each
couple would file an information return similar to the Form
1065 that partnerships file. All income and all deductions
could be aggregated and reported on the information return.
This would relieve partners from determining whose income
is whose and who paid which deduction, a benefit that the
current joint return provides for married couples. Once
taxable income has been calculated, it should be allocated
between the two partners, either fifty-fifty or in accordance
with their own alternative allocation.
Under this scheme, each partner or spouse could then file
an individual tax return and everyone would use the same
rate schedule to compute the tax owed. Marriage would no
longer create penalties or bonuses. All couples who wished to
form a tax partnership could do so. Couples who did not wish
to form such partnerships would report their own income and
deductions as single taxpayers do now. The federal tax
partnership rules would provide the sole route for splitting
income and deductions. Spouses or partners who elected to
file individual returns outside the tax partnership regime
162. The economic substance doctrine has long been part of the "common
law" of taxation. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000). In partnership tax, there is statutory recognition of
special allocations of gain and loss, but only if the allocation has "substantial
economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(b) (2000).
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would report their own earnings and their share of income
from property based on state rules of ownership.
While partners should be allowed to split earned income
in any way they want, the presumption should be fifty-fifty.
Taxation would follow the ownership of the income under the
agreement. Income from property would be split in accord
with the allocated ownership interest in the income-producing
property. Income that is not consumed would have to remain
in the partnership 163  for future consumption or for
distribution at the termination of the relationship by death or
divorce.
This solution not only erases the difference in tax
treatment between spouses and partners that derive from
application of different state laws, but also erases the
difference in treatment between spouses and all unmarried
couples. State property law would be important only in
determining property ownership rights of couples who elected
to file outside of the partnership regime. Legal obligations of
support could remain relevant, although my own preference
would be to exempt all payments of support from the gift tax.
State law, however, would need to enforce the tax
partnership agreements at dissolution of the partnership,
whether by "divorce" or at death.164 Property divisions at
these two points in time have always been a core concern of
state law, typically domestic relations law. Principles of
federalism militate against a federal tax scheme that would
impose property distribution rules upon states that are in
conflict with state law. 165 It may even be unconstitutional for
the federal government to intervene in such matters, either
because these matters are not within the limited powers of
the federal government or because such intervention would
163. There need not be a separate partnership account as such, but the
spouses would have to retain some record to support a claim of property
ownership that is not fifty-fifty. Unconsumed income converted into savings
would be represented in assets owned by the couple, holding title in whatever
manner they wished. But if the property is ever distributed to one partner or
spouse, it would have to be done in accord with the underlying "capital
accounts" in the partnership and if there were insufficient proof of unequal
accounts, then the accounts would be presumed fifty-fifty.
164. Absent effective enforcement, the terms of the agreements would have
no economic substance.
165. See Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act:
Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 419 (1999)
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violate the Tenth Amendment by commandeering the states
governments to conform to the federal rules.
166
Since the decision in Marvin v. Marvin, however, all
states, other than Illinois, have been willing to enforce
contracts between unmarried cohabiting couples. Thus, for
unmarried couples outside of Illinois, agreements to share
income and property should be fully enforceable under state
law. Agreements between spouses, on the other hand, present
another problem at least to the extent such agreements are
intended to change the state's domestic relations laws. At
common law, postnuptial agreements between spouses
regarding their property rights were generally void. While
that rule is changing, states continue to apply close scrutiny
to such contracts and sometimes hold them void as against
public policy, as lacking in consideration, or as
unconscionable. 67
The details of the development of this federal definition
of domestic partnership are for another project.168 Here, the
point is to suggest the possibility of such an arrangement and
to show that a federal definition of domestic partner would
remove many of the perceived problems caused by a tax
system that over-relies on marriage. The most important
aspects of such a federal solution are that it would ensure
uniformity among states and, as supreme federal law, would
provide an accurate reporting status even for same sex
couples living in states where civil unions and domestic
166. See id. at 444.
167. See Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3 595 (Tenn. 2004)(holding
postnuptial agreement void for lack of consideration and discussing history of
judicial reluctance to enforce such agreements).
168. The definition would need to be narrower than the ALI definition that is
suggested for property divisions between unmarried cohabitants. See Mark
Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners Recommendation,
2001 BYU L. REV. 1135 (2001), for a description of these proposals. Lawrence
Waggoner has proposed a definition for "committed partners" to be treated as
intestate heirs under the Uniform Probate Code. Partners must share a
common household and have a marriage-like relationship as established by
meeting a list of factors. The federal definition may not need to list such factors
because it would in effect create the sharing of financial resources and property
by virtue of recognizing the reality of the partnership agreement that is the
basis for the tax return. But see Jennifer A. Drobac and Antony Page, A
Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying Buisness Partnership and Family
Law, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 349 (2007), describing a proposal much like the one I'm
suggesting, but intended to be adopted at the state level.
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partnerships are not possible. 169  It would also end the
marriage tax penalty. The goal of such a scheme is to tax all
families fairly.
169. Many states have statutes that ban recognition of same-sex marriages.
But an increasing number of states have added prohibitions on recognition of
same-sex civil unions or partnerships of any kind. ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 2
(2004) ("Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially
similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas."); GA.
CONST. art. 1, § 4, para. I (2004) ("No union between persons of the same sex
shall be recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage."); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon Supp. 2003) ('A marriage between persons of
the same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public policy of this state and is
void in this state."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004) ("A civil union, partnership
contract, or other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to
bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is prohibited.").
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